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As commonplace as it is to note that the failure of postcolonial 
regimes and the continuation of imperialist wars has lead postcolonial 
scholarship to ring its insights in a melancholic key, such melancholia has 
perhaps irrevocably highlighted the difference between the given state of 
the world and the uncertain concepts with which we seek to apprehend it. 
It has, in other words, forced a greater attention to the sufficiency of our 
own reading practices. Some of the finer examples of this focus on read-
ing practice itself are Dipesh Chakrabarty’s attempts to rethink historical 
difference, David Scott’s call to deploy tragedy rather than romance as 
the most fitting narrative for nationalist liberation movements, and even 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s cautionary tale about imputing a voice to 
subaltern figures (“Can the Subaltern Speak?”). As each of these examples 
makes clear, to focus on reading practice means, simultaneously, to attend 
to the object at hand and by means of a reorientation of vision, refunction 
the object itself.
Such a reorientation of vision may take the form of excavating 
an archive for newly constituted objects of postcolonial study, rethinking 
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the foundational categories of political representation as a concomitant 
process of such archiving, and producing new forms of reading that place 
unexpected elements into play with each other. The work of the Subaltern 
Studies Collective encompassed each of these reorientations. At stake at 
each reorientation is a revision of the relationship between the object and 
the concept, on the one hand, and inherited tradition and its interruption, 
on the other. The political and cultural implications of subaltern studies 
remain current, if not made more relevant than ever in the current political 
moment, when freedom and its universal subject are consistently invoked 
in aid of endless war.
Writing during World War II, Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno were among the intellectuals trying to provide an explanation 
of the violence they saw around them. The motivating concerns behind 
their well-known critique of Enlightenment reason remain familiar to our 
contemporary moment: “Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense 
as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings 
from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth 
is radiant with triumphant calamity. Enlightenment’s program was the 
disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fan-
tasy with knowledge” (1). These words could easily serve as an antecedent 
to the project of subaltern studies, concerned as this project is with the 
nexus of agency, representation, and political emancipation under con-
ditions of increasing rationalization and instrumentalization of power. 
One key lesson of subaltern studies is the recognition of the fundamental 
nonidentity (and I use Adorno’s word deliberately) between the apparatus 
of the state and the citizen-subjects on whose behalf it acts and whom it 
produces through its actions. The subaltern, moreover, is a figure of pure 
nonidentity.1 For some intellectuals of the Subaltern Studies Collective, this 
nonidentical nature of the subaltern comes into sharpest relief when one 
considers that the abstract citizen–subject of rights is a secular abstraction 
necessary to the disenchantment of the world, of which the modern forms 
of nation-state are one effect.2
Such disenchantment and the attendant rise of the secular 
state form receive a sustained discussion in Chakrabarty’s influential 
book Provincializing Europe. The figure of the subaltern appears in this 
work as a subject situated outside the orbit of discourses that claim to 
represent this figure. The main problematic that Chakrabarty examines 
is the frustration of the postcolonial historian whose object of study (the 
subaltern, for example) inhabits an enchanted life-world while modern 
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categories of historical narration (inherited from European modernity) 
are thoroughly disenchanted, secular, and designed to record events as 
they happen in empty, homogenous time. Subaltern figures and Indian 
bourgeois subjects are as nonidentical (to return to Adorno’s language) 
to their historical narration in modern regimes of knowledge production 
as they are to the modern nation-state (Chakrabarty’s subaltern figure, 
as we will see, turns out to be the Bengali middle-class life-world). For 
Chakrabarty, such figures serve several purposes: they mark the “breach” 
within our modern categories of historical narration; they make us aware 
of the “time-knots,” or the existence of multiple and simultaneous tempo-
ralities, which we inhabit in the everyday; and they index the existence of 
life-worlds not reducible to capital or other grand narratives of modernity.3
Chakrabarty’s work is part of a recognizable tradition of left 
criticism, in which the hegemonic figure (whether cast as the West, impe-
rialism, universal liberalism, or capitalism) is a vehicle for producing a 
homogenous world—not only through the export and imposition of cultural 
artifacts but, more insidiously, in its production of epistemological frame-
works that claim to speak for the whole globe. The desire of this tradition 
of criticism tends, in response to the homogenizing imperatives of the 
powerful, to produce figures of inassimilable difference, whose difference 
then becomes the ground for resistance to such epistemic, cultural, and 
political hegemony.4 On the one hand, this move resuscitates the subject 
by producing it as a subversive, resisting, and disruptive agency. On the 
other hand, it overlooks the fact that hegemonic structures tend as eas-
ily to produce difference through the very mechanisms that guarantee 
equivalence (more on this below).5 Laundry lists of unique differences, 
therefore, are indexes of an interpretive and political desire, a desire 
that often requires recapitulation to the familiar binarisms of subordina-
tion/subversion, homogeneity/heterogeneity, and increasingly, immoral/
moral.6 I use the phrase left criticism here because this move is not specific 
to subaltern studies or postcolonial theory. My critique of projects that seek 
out difference-as-resistance should not be taken to imply that there is no 
such thing as difference or resistance. Nor is my primary contention one 
about essentialism; antiessentialist accounts of difference also continue 
to cast difference in the role of resistance and disruption. Instead, I take 
issue with the ease with which, in such critical projects, difference itself 
comes to secure resistance, disruption, and subversion. To speak of dif-
ference means simultaneously to speak of contestation; difference and 
disruption threaten to sediment and ossify into each other, and it is such 
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seemingly natural processes of sedimentation that I hope to unsettle. Once 
the slippage between difference and disruption is conceded, it is a short 
step for the subject-in-difference to become the moral subject.
My aim in this analysis is thus twofold: on the one hand, this 
essay is about reading practices and attempts to begin constructing a read-
ing practice of historical difference through Frankfurt School dialectics 
and Frantz Fanon’s phenomenology of difference. The second aim is to 
rethink historical difference without the guarantee of subversion, resis-
tance, or disruption that has come to be associated with it in postcolonial 
thought, in which the subject-in-difference (the subaltern, the racialized 
subject, etc.) implicitly circulates in a moral economy as the figure of 
higher moral ground. My reading of Chakrabarty requires detaching his 
formulations from his interpretive and theoretical context and reanimat-
ing them dialectically. Given Chakrabarty’s stated hesitance about dia-
lectical reading practices,7 my reading requires doing violence to these 
formulations, but I can only hope that such violence is more transforma-
tive than destructive. The argument that follows analyzes the problem-
atic ground of historical difference as formulated in Chakrabarty’s work, 
considers how Walter Benjamin’s and Theodor Adorno’s formulations on 
mimesis might be useful for such postcolonial considerations, and ends 
with a reading of Fanon’s phenomenology of difference, which suggests a 
strategy for rethinking mimetic acts and subjects in difference.
History, 1 and 2
For Chakrabarty, the primary issue at hand is one of representa-
tion: How does one represent experiences—for example, of belief in coeval 
gods—using the secular master codes of history writing? Chakrabarty 
turns to Marx for a solution, and outlines what he calls “the two histories 
of capital.” First, Chakrabarty reminds us of Marx’s elaboration: “abstract 
labor” is what actually mediates the exchange between commodities; not 
money, but abstract labor forges a social relation between objects, and an 
object-ive relation between people.8 Abstraction not only happens in the 
practice of exchange, but it happens without one’s conscious awareness of 
it. Moreover, it is the source of the commodity’s theological niceties and 
metaphysical subtleties, and both a precondition and the limit for capital’s 
reproduction.
Through a reading of sections from Theories of Surplus Value 
and the Grundrisse, Chakrabarty teases out two histories of capital. 
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According to the first, capital in its “Becoming” posits its own past, not 
simply as a calendrical or chronological past, but as “the past that the cat-
egory [of Capital] retrospectively [and logically] posits” (62–63). This past 
is, then, a tautological construction. In Theories of Surplus Value, Marx 
called this history “capital’s antecedent ‘posited by itself’ ”: in Chakrab-
arty’s words, “This is the universal and necessary history we associate 
with capital. It forms the backbone of the usual narratives of transition to 
the capitalist mode of production” (63). Chakrabarty calls this History 1.
To History 1, Chakrabarty opposes History 2, the ground for 
historical difference, which names a process also described briefly in 
Theories of Surplus Value, from which he quotes: “Elements of History 
2, Marx says, are also ‘antecedents’ of capital, in that capital ‘encounters 
them as antecedents,’ but ‘not as antecedents established by itself, not as 
forms of its own life-process’ ” (63). So among the antecedents to capital are 
both relations that aid in its self-reproduction and also others that do not. 
These antecedents of capital that existed outside of capital’s life-processes 
were, most surprisingly, money and commodity, both of which eventually 
prove foundational for the conceptualization of capital:
Marx recognizes the possibility that money and commodity, as 
relations, could have existed in history without necessarily giv-
ing rise to capital. Since they did not necessarily look forward 
to capital, they make up the kind of past that I have called His-
tory 2. This example of the heterogeneity Marx reads into the 
history of money and commodity shows that the relations that 
do not contribute to the reproduction of the logic of capital can 
be intimately intertwined with the relations that do. (63)
Capital, according to Marx, must first destroy or subjugate these anteced-
ents to its own logic: “[Capital] originally finds the commodity already in 
existence, but not as its own product, and likewise finds money circula-
tion, but not as an element in its own reproduction. [. . .] But both of them 
must first be destroyed as independent forms and subordinated to indus-
trial capital. Violence (the State) is used against interest-bearing capital 
by means of compulsory reduction of interest rates” (qtd. in Chakrabarty 
64). Chakrabarty reads this citation poststructurally: “Marx thus writes 
into the intimate space of capital an element of deep uncertainty. [.  .  .] 
History 2s are thus not separate from capital; they inhere in capital and 
yet interrupt and punctuate the run of capital’s own logic” (64). However, 
Chakrabarty has not quoted Marx fully—the final sentence, if quoted fully, 
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should read: “Violence (the State) is used against interest-bearing capital 
by means of compulsory reduction of interest rates, so that it is no longer 
able to dictate terms to industrial capital” (Theories 167; emphasis added). 
Earlier Marx writes, “[T]he commercial and interest-bearing forms of 
capital are older than industrial capital,” that is, these, like money and 
commodity, “in the capitalist mode of production [become] the basic form 
of the capital relations dominating bourgeois society” (167). Therefore, 
once capital destroys or subordinates them, they can no longer “dictate 
terms” to industrial capital. So the “deep uncertainty” written into capi-
tal, which for Chakrabarty, in the form of History 2s, “interrupt[s] and 
punctuate[s],” appears to do neither, as this “uncertainty,” if deep and 
present at all, seems to be wholly subservient to the logic of the capitalist 
mode of production. On the subject of these antecedents (commercial and 
interest-bearing capital, money, and commodity) that capital encounters 
not as “forms of its own life-process,” but that capital destroys or subordi-
nates to itself, Marx continues: “But this [the use of violence through the 
state] is a method characteristic of the least developed stages of capitalist 
production. The real way in which industrial capital subjugates interest-
bearing capital is the creation of a procedure specific to itself—the credit 
system” (167). We find here both Marx’s stagism, which Chakrabarty is 
keen to ignore in this instance, and an explicit statement that industrial 
capital eventually does not need an external agent (the state) in order to 
destroy or subordinate these independent antecedents that it encountered, 
because its very logic, that is, its very structure “specific to itself,” comes 
to subjugate these antecedents to capital. Which is to say, in later stages, 
money and commodity are not fundamentally out of joint with themselves, 
that is, they do not “interrupt and punctuate” the run of capital.
As I mentioned above, Chakrabarty has read Marx’s stagism 
selectively. On the one hand, as Marx himself states in the Grundrisse, 
the limits to capital are “constantly overcome but just as constantly pos-
ited” (410), that is, contradictions can be structural to capital itself. On 
the other hand, some contradictions would lead to capital’s expansion and 
then create the circumstances of its dissolution. So, schematically, we may 
say that there are those contradictions that are structural, inherent in the 
logic of capital, and there are others that become historically sublated 
into capital and temporally move it toward its dissolution. We notice on 
closer inspection that for Marx, there is not a strict separation between 
these two types of negations or “antitheses.” For example, while machin-
ery acts to reduce living labor, whose abstraction is the precondition for 
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capital’s reproduction (so this is a structural contradiction), this reduction 
also creates the conditions necessary for the abolition of capital and the 
category of “labor” altogether (here it becomes a historical antithesis).9 
This later transformation of what I am loosely calling the “structural con-
tradiction” into the “historical contradiction” alludes to Etienne Balibar’s 
central concern in his contribution to Reading Capital: “The only intrinsic 
result of the contradiction, which is completely immanent to the economic 
structure, does not tend towards the supersession of the contradiction, 
but to the perpetuation of its conditions” (Althusser and Balibar 291).10 
Chakrabary aims to bracket this immanence of the structural contradic-
tion that is at the same time a historical contradiction when he abstracts a 
radical ambiguity from Marx’s claim that “ ‘remnants’ of ‘vanished social 
formations’ ” are “ ‘partially still unconquered’ ”:
Does “partly still unconquered” refer to something that is “not 
yet conquered” or something that is in principle “unconquer-
able”? [. . .] [What] kind of temporal space is signaled by “not 
yet”? [. . .] The limits to capital, he [Marx] reminds us, are “con-
stantly overcome but just as constantly posited.” It is as though 
the “not yet” is what keeps capital going [.  .  .] internal to the 
very being (that is, logic) of capital. [. . .] Difference [. . .] lives 
in intimate and plural relationships to capital, ranging from 
opposition to neutrality. (65–66)11
As we have seen in the example of technology (machinery) in industrial 
capitalism, the contradiction simultaneously “keeps capital going” and 
signals the temporal, historicist reading of “not yet,” as that which will 
partly lead to capital’s dissolution. One does not have to choose, then, 
between the structural reading and the historical one.12
That being as it may, it is fruitful to examine the concept of 
History 2, even if its ground, as outlined by Chakrabarty, is precarious. As 
we will see, History 2 is the intimate correlative of History 1, which is to 
say that it is not the dialectical Other of History 1 and therefore cannot be 
subsumed into it. (This is the deconstructive move that preserves, without 
canceling, History 2.) History 2 is constituted by all of those ways of being 
in the world that the laborer brings to the factory floor that are the supple-
ment to History 1 and the structure of capital’s logic. While History 2 in no 
way impedes the abstraction of labor, it is a sort of grouping of “other kinds 
of pasts” that “enable the human bearer of labor power to enact other ways 
of being in the world—other than, that is, being the bearer of labor power” 
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(66). Furthermore, this History 2, which interrupts the “totalizing thrusts 
of History 1,” cannot be fully documented: it is composed of pasts “embod-
ied in the person’s daily habits, in unselfconscious collective practices, in 
his or her reflexes about what it means to relate to objects in the world as 
a human being and together with other human beings in his given envi-
ronment. Nothing in it is automatically aligned with the logic of capital” 
(66). Ultimately, History 2 is the basis upon which one may claim historical 
difference, in that this concept allows one to conceptualize “more affective 
narratives of human belonging where life forms, although porous to one 
another, do not seem exchangeable through a third term of equivalence 
such as abstract labor” (71). Chakrabarty expands the scope of History 2 
from commodity and money to include those aspects of one’s life-world 
that remain outside of the logic of capital, even if they are concurrent 
with History 1. History 2 is the phenomenological excess that capital can-
not subsume; it emerges as a category of thought when History 1 is placed 
under erasure; and it takes local and differentiated forms.
If History 1 is the dominant history that marches on, then 
History 2 is contained within it, and it marches as well. What, then, is 
at stake in the concept of History 2? The closest thing to an answer pro-
vided by Chakrabarty is: “To stay with the heterogeneity of the moment 
when the historian meets with the peasant is, then, to stay with the dif-
ference between these two gestures,” the gesture of seeing the colonial 
peasant as an object of (secular) historical study and as a person who is 
a contemporary, whose beliefs in spirits could present possibilities for 
the present. “Taken together,” Chakrabarty writes, “the two gestures put 
us in touch with the plural ways of being that make up our own pres-
ent” (108; emphasis added). Is History 2 then a heuristic device for the 
historian, in order that he or she may “stay with” the heterogeneity of 
the historical object and be “put in touch” with alternate ways of being 
in the present? It would seem that the back door of poststructuralist 
reading has led us to the scene of a history written under the impera-
tive that historical categories fully represent the subject in difference. 
If the aim of historiography is to “stay with” and be “put in touch” with 
the split subaltern and metropolitan subjects, then what kind of read-
ing (and writing) strategies are adequate to History 2s? Are “accurate” 
determinations of such histories—splits, gaps, and differences—possible? 
The semiotic caesura that Chakrabarty transposes onto the realm of 
production textualizes materiality, and in this magic trick the material 
disappears. The enchanted life-world is no more than the space of an 
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acknowledged gap in a historiography that aims to represent the present 
moment accurately.
Which is to say that Chakrabarty’s concern with represent-
ing the subaltern more accurately requires that we forget the lessons of 
poststructuralism itself, not least of which is a recognition that the terms 
of representation—whether linguistic or juridical structures—function 
through slippage, deferral, and performative gestures whose direction 
cannot be predicted in advance. Ironically enough, the concern that led 
Chakrabarty to the formulation of History 2 is poststructuralist in spirit: 
under what terms of legibility are the Third World and subaltern history 
narrated? His elaboration of History 2 requires, at a fundamental level, 
a certain “betrayal” of the poststructuralism he marshals in the service 
of his analysis because at some point in the analysis this initial question 
transmutes into a different question: how can we narrate historical dif-
ference more accurately? As if this were simply a matter of correcting a 
distortion. My claim is that History 2 as an analytic is an answer, and a 
very promising one at that, to a question that is nowhere posed in Chakrab-
arty’s text: what processes of worlding are grounds for historical differ-
ence? In order to answer this question, we need to add something to our 
consideration of historical difference: a theory of mimesis.
Regardless of the precarious philosophical ground of History 
2 as formulated by Chakrabarty, such a rich concept may provide a way 
of conceptualizing historical difference without resorting to cultural 
relativism. Chakrabarty’s account of History 2 highlights and preserves 
the irreducible particularity of ways of being that escape abstraction. 
History 2 names precisely such a particularity. The relationship between 
this particularity and the abstracting mechanism of capital is simultane-
ously—and paradoxically—one of a bar and an intrusion: History 2 remains 
outside of the orbit of capital’s Becoming and intimately “disrupts” the 
run of such Becoming, yet it seems to have no effect on the reproduction 
of capital’s conditions of production. To what extent, then, can it be said 
to be “outside” of capital, since capital has of course constituted History 
2 as an outside (“the past that capital logically posits”)? The relationship 
between the particular and the universal, between History 2 and History 
1, remains insufficiently addressed.
Within this conundrum of the particular’s relation to the uni-
versal lies the more fundamental problematic of mimesis, insofar as every 
articulation of the relationship between the particular and the universal 
seeks out the precise manner in which each represents the other. Here, 
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Benjamin’s theory of mimesis is rich with implications for the colonial and 
postcolonial scene. His formulation is not restricted to conceptions of veri-
similitude, but encompasses anthropological, materialist, philosophical, 
linguistic, epistemological, and aesthetic concerns. The mimetic faculty 
refers to what he calls nonsensuous or nonrepresentational similarity 
(unsinnliche Ähnlichkeit); it is the ancient capacity for recognizing cor-
respondences that unconsciously permeate our everyday life. Thinking 
past theories of mimesis informed by nineteenth-century idealism or even 
ancient Greek formulations, Benjamin locates the mimetic faculty as the 
“ur-phenomenon of all artistic activity” (Selected 3: 137, 127). Mimesis is 
associated, variously, with children’s play and repetition, the hermeneutics 
of historical materialism, ancient practices of divination, language, and the 
twin poles of semblance and play. The myriad of investments congealed in 
Benjamin’s conception of mimesis is precisely the result of the checkered 
nature of this concept in his work. I would like to tease out the implica-
tions of Benjamin’s theory of mimesis in relation to his speculations on 
the concept of history in order to constellate historical difference with a 
practice of its historical narration.
Mimesis, Semblance, Play
The concern with mimesis runs through much of Benjamin’s 
oeuvre, from his early essays on language to his later melancholic rumina-
tions on the philosophy of history. In his 1933 fragment “On the Mimetic 
Faculty,” Benjamin writes:
Nature produces similarities; one need only think of mimicry. 
The highest talent for producing similarities, however, is man’s. 
His gift for seeing similarity is nothing but a rudiment of the once 
powerful compulsion to become similar and to behave mimeti-
cally. There is not a single one of his higher functions in which 
his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role.
 This faculty has a history, however, in both the phy-
logenetic and the ontogenetic sense. As regards the latter, play 
is to a great extent its school. Children’s play is everywhere 
permeated by mimetic modes of behavior, and its realm is by no 
means limited to what one person can imitate in another. The 
child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher, but also 
a windmill and a train. (Selected 3: 720)
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Children mimic objects as well as animals and humans. Fantasy drives the 
production of nonsensuous correspondences in children’s play: “Drawers 
must become arsenal and zoo, crime museum and crypt. ‘To tidy up’ would 
be to demolish an edifice full of prickly chestnuts that are spiky clubs, tin 
foil that is hoarded silver, bricks that are coffins, cacti that are totem poles, 
and copper pennies that are shields” (Selected 1:465). Nonsensuous corre-
spondence, the aspect of the mimetic faculty that Benjamin calls the basis 
of all language, reveals itself in children’s play to be a profoundly creative 
principle by which the given world may be reordered by the child’s desire, 
by which newness itself enters the world. In a footnote to the second ver-
sion of the work of art essay, Benjamin ponders the intimacy in mimetic 
practices, between semblance and play:
Dance and language, gestures of body and lips, are the earliest 
manifestations of mimesis.—The mime presents his subject as a 
semblance. One could also say that he plays his subject. Thus we 
encounter the polarity informing mimesis. In mimesis, tightly 
interfolded like cotyledons, slumber the two aspects of art: sem-
blance and play. [. . .] What is lost in the withering of semblance 
and the decay of the aura in works of art is matched by a huge 
gain in the scope for play [Spiel-Raum]. (Selected 3: 127)
The mimetic faculty must be historicized, and, like all perception, it 
undergoes a transformation with the proliferation of technological repro-
duction. The newly expanded capacity for play means the production 
of new possibilities for the channeling of desires and dreams. In fact, 
Benjamin traces an intimate connection between desire and play: “This 
second technology is a system in which the mastering of elementary social 
forces is a precondition for playing [das Spiel] with natural forces. Just as 
a child who has learned to grasp stretches out its hand for the moon as it 
would for a ball, so humanity, in its efforts at innervation, sets its sights 
as much on currently utopian goals as on goals within reach” (Selected 3: 
124). This playful reaching out is in fact motivated by a world-historical 
dream whose object may be impossibly out of reach but yet present on the 
horizon. Regarding this reaching out to the moon, Miriam Hansen writes, 
“To a degree, therefore, innervation is necessarily based on miscognition, 
constituted within the register of the Imaginary (in Lacan’s sense): the 
child will never succeed in grasping the moon. But from this miscognition 
arise creative and transformative energies (different from the Lacanian 
scenario), in art as well as in politics” (“Benjamin and Cinema” 324).13 The 
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basis of these creative and transformative energies is the mimetic faculty 
itself, understood as an embodied form of cognition, or the aesthetic in its 
root sense.14 For Benjamin (as for Lacan), mimesis names the very process 
of self-fashioning. Unlike the Lacanian model, however, such mimetic 
self-fashioning is inseparable from worlding, from producing historically 
specific life-worlds (mimesis-as-worlding).15
This happens, of course, in different forms throughout history 
and throughout the world. Historical difference, then, is not a feature of the 
Third World and its subjects only. Ernst Bloch, writing around the same 
time as Benjamin was ruminating on the mimetic faculty, reread Marx’s 
remarks about uneven development as a theory of temporality: “Not all 
people exist in the same Now. [. . .] In general, different years resound in 
the one that has just been recorded and prevails. Moreover, they do not 
emerge in a hidden way as previously but rather, they contradict the Now 
in a very particular way, awry, from the rear. The strength of this untimely 
course has become evident; it promised nothing less than new life, despite 
its looking to the old” (Bloch 22). Bloch’s reading of these “nonsynchro-
nous” ways of being is rigorously dialectical: Nazism marshals such non-
synchronism in its service even as the “new life” promised by these other 
times existing in the Now could potentially make way for a better order 
of things.16 If history moves within the medium of an empty homogenous 
time, each present moment is contradicted by nonsynchronicity. Cer-
tainly Bloch, like Benjamin and Adorno, is guilty of a Eurocentrism that 
does not admit of alternate temporalities except within Europe’s frame, 
but the critique of Eurocentrism is a necessary but insufficient ground 
for rethinking historical difference. In order for a reading practice to do 
more than point a finger, one must attempt to detach such insights from 
their discrete contexts, in a Benjaminian spirit, and refunction them for 
postcolonial thought.
In Benjamin’s fragmentary account of the mimetic faculty, it 
is subject to time’s vicissitudes, as the primary figure for articulating the 
connections between history, mimesis, and dreaming is the child. Human-
ity, like a child, finds itself adrift and disoriented within the changing 
configurations of body and image space that new visual technologies 
make possible, vacillating between an actual experience of the world (and 
the body) in fragments and a reaching out toward unity and a sense of 
wholeness. Technology subjects the collective to cognitive training, and 
Benjamin defines play as “the inexhaustible reservoir of all the experi-
menting procedures” of modern technology, for which repetition, testing, 
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and experimentation are the hallmarks of production. Within the endless 
testing and experimenting procedures of modern technology, “once is as 
good as never” (Selected 3: 107). If repetition figures, à la Freud, as a trau-
matic symptom,17 it simultaneously holds out the possibility—as play—of 
reimagining the course of history. Within the cultural sphere, the figure 
of the child, marking ontogenesis as well as phylogenesis, encapsulates 
the predicaments and possibilities faced by humanity confronted by a 
catastrophic history. In the face of history’s repeated failures, mimesis—as 
a combination of semblance and play—holds out the possibility of trying 
yet again.
The other side of such revolutionary potential is, of course, end-
less war and the production of more sophisticated weaponry. Benjamin, 
like his contemporaries Siegfried Kracauer and Bloch, reads technology 
dialectically, even if he is prone to greater optimism than his interlocu-
tor, Adorno. In this discussion of mimesis, I would like to emphasize that 
Benjamin’s theories on technology, reproduction, and the historically 
shifting configurations of sense perception assume a theory of mimesis-
as-worlding. Mimesis is nowhere foundationally related to capitalism, 
which is simply one historical means of organizing it. As a beginning of a 
theory of historical difference, mimesis as an analytic allows for historical 
insight across both time and geography, but such universalism is not of 
the order of a classically Marxist teleology, liberal humanist understand-
ings of the subject, imperialist discourses on freedom—the list can go on. 
Mimesis is the theoretical ground upon which Benjamin’s other concerns 
about history and aesthetics are built, and, as I will show, the concern with 
the aesthetic in Benjamin can be read as a theory of historical difference.
History and Dialectics
In Benjamin’s work, discussions on mimesis interpenetrate 
with insights about time and history. The key concept that mediates these 
two strands of thought—mimesis and worlding, on the one hand, and his-
tory and technology, on the other—is sense perception, the root meaning 
of “aesthetic.” What makes Benjamin’s thoughts on history and dialectics 
so elliptical is that he persistently keeps in play two scenes: the scene of 
the historical materialist and his or her reading practice (or the forms of 
historical narration themselves) and the referential world, the object that 
lends unique insight into history. This double scene of interpretation is 
nothing other than the dialectical method itself. If, as Benjamin writes 
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of the mimetic faculty, “seeing similarity” is a residue of the “compul-
sion” to behave mimetically, then reading practices cannot be detached 
from the objects they seek to apprehend. If “the questions that humanity 
brings to nature are in part conditioned by the level of production,” not 
only does nature itself have a history, but the form these questions take 
are also occasions for reading material realities. Such reluctance to make 
the scene of reading transparent should appeal to postcolonial theorists, 
given the concern in postcolonial thought with the histories of institu-
tions and knowledge practices that assume transparency as they seek 
to manage and regulate the terms of legibility for colonial subjects. The 
aesthetic artifact (of which, as the reader will note by now, the artwork 
is simply one example) in Benjamin’s work is not a means of showing us 
how “things really were” in the past, as it would be in a historicist enter-
prise in the tradition of Wilhelm Dilthey. Rather, to put it in postcolonial 
terms, the focus on our own scenes of reading asks why this particular 
difference has drawn our interpretative gaze; what is it about our present 
moment that makes such a focus imperative? These questions dialectically 
lead to the second scene and its central questions: what can our object of 
study reveal about the material realities that produced it and the pres-
ent realities that have led us to isolate it as an object worthy of study? If 
theory forgets the referential world that was the source of its inspiration 
in the first place, it risks becoming no more than a solipsistic enterprise 
like cultural history, which, according to Benjamin, “may augment the 
weight of the treasure accumulating on the back of humanity, but does 
not provide the strength to shake off this burden so as to take control of 
it” (Selected 3: 268).
A properly dialectical reading process does not deploy “the 
negation of the negation” in the service of a homogenizing narrative, but 
it requires that it allow itself to be dialectically transformed by the object, 
the referential world, rather than adopting a distanced, contemplative 
attitude toward it. In “Dream Kitsch,” Benjamin writes:
What we used to call art begins at a distance of two meters from 
the body. But now, in kitsch, the world of things advances on 
the human being; it yields to his uncertain grasp and ultimately 
fashions its figures in his interior. The new man bears within 
himself the very quintessence of the old forms, and what evolves 
in the confrontation with a particular milieu from the second 
half of the nineteenth century—in the dreams, as well as the 
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words and images, of certain artists—is a creature who deserves 
the name of “furnished man.” (Selected 2: 4–5)
Interiority does not exist except through a transformative relationship to 
the outside world. Historical difference is not a priori and therefore simply 
a matter of discovery, “objective” positioning in the Marxist sense, but it 
exists in the interaction between objects and subjects. The form of the 
object that indexes the specific lifework and epoch has its corollary in 
the subject whose sense perception has been organized through specific 
material conditions. So a history that takes account of historical differ-
ence would need to attend not only to the products of mimesis but also 
to the affective and perceptual makeup of the subject who cannot help 
but be “furnished” by producing it. Benjamin’s concern with the histori-
cal constitution of perception reminds us that for him the aesthetic is an 
embodied concept, tied up with the whole constellation of flesh, affect, 
and sensation, but also imagination, ideation, and thought.
The hermeneutic project for historical materialism is one akin 
to dream interpretation, read as a functioning of the mimetic faculty, as 
recognition of nonsensuous correspondences. Benjamin’s use of the refuse 
of history would entail ripping images of the past (because “History decays 
into images, not into stories” [Arcades N11, 4]) from their context and plac-
ing them into constellations with the present. Montage not only sheds light 
on the objects it juxtaposes but also makes visible its own method. As such, 
it can be mobilized toward undoing the defining phantasmagoric character 
of commodities, namely, their dependence on making invisible the traces 
of their own production. Benjamin gives us an example: “The [Bomber 
planes] remind us of what Leonardo da Vinci expected of man in flight; that 
he was to ascend to the skies ‘in order to seek snow on the mountaintops 
and bring it back to the city to spread on the sweltering streets in summer’ ” 
(Arcades N18a, 2). A historicist would perhaps place da Vinci’s comment 
in the continuum of his biography or possibly discover through this com-
ment a Renaissance fascination with flying humans, ultimately missing 
its critical potential for the present moment by enslaving this image in its 
“context.”18 Ripping da Vinci’s image out of its context allows us to bring 
the present into what Benjamin calls “a critical state” (Arcades N7a, 5). 
Reading becomes a transformative act when discarded images of the past, 
torn from their discreet historicist contexts, are juxtaposed with other 
images in order that the historical materialist may scrutinize the context 
(if you will) of the present moment. This present moment is understood 
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not as a telos of past history, but as a possible interruption of it. We see 
here once again that the historical materialist must be consistently poised 
for the dialectical movement of destruction and construction, condemna-
tion and redemption, as Benjamin notes in “Central Park”: “The course 
of history, seen in terms of the concept of catastrophe, can actually claim 
no more attention from thinkers than a child’s kaleidoscope, which with 
every turn of the hand dissolves the established order into a new array. 
There is profound truth in this image. The concepts of the ruling class have 
always been the mirrors that enabled an image of ‘order’ to prevail.—The 
kaleidoscope must be smashed” (Selected 4: 164). We encounter here the 
destructive side of dialectics: in the wake of the catastrophe that is history, 
the first step for the historical materialist is to destroy the kaleidoscope and 
blast the continuum of homogenous empty time by grasping the images 
of the past for the present. In juxtaposition to the problematic of histori-
cal difference with which Chakrabarty wrestles, Benjamin’s vision of the 
critical project that counters historicism and makes use of the wreckage 
of history is a universalist vision.19 His aim here is to redeem a collective 
(consciousness): to the universalist, homogenous, empty time, Benjamin 
opposes a blasting into messianic universal time.20 What kind of univer-
sality is this? Placed in a context of international relations of production, 
Benjamin’s work raises several intriguing questions, among them: Were 
the forms of perception organized in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries universal—like the commodity form itself—both within Europe 
and also outside of it?
Phenomenology and Difference
Certainly one must “stretch” Benjamin’s categories in order to 
avoid seeing the outside of Europe simply as a set of particular variations 
on a “universal” theme whose fundamentals have already been established 
in Europe. The plea to “stretch” the categories of the Western intellectual 
tradition to make them useful for postcolonial problematics comes, of 
course, from Frantz Fanon, who noted that Marxism must be “stretched” to 
take account of colonial difference.21 Fanon’s own call for a “new human-
ity” in the final words of A Dying Colonialism suggests a revised notion of 
a universal humanity: “The Revolution in depth, the true one, precisely 
because it changes man and renews society, has reached an advanced 
stage. This oxygen which creates and shapes a new humanity—this, too, 
is the Algerian Revolution” (181). I will not detail here the lineaments of 
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Fanon’s notion of universalism or new humanity,22 but I wish to analyze 
the phenomenology of difference, the play of mimesis, and the historical 
constitution of the senses that undergird the “true Revolution.” Mimesis 
is central to Fanon’s account of the rise of revolutionary consciousness. In 
A Dying Colonialism, Fanon describes the unveiling of Algerian women 
who, while “passing” as Europeanized Arab women, work for the Front de 
Libération Nationale (fln) and smuggle explosives into the white quarters 
of colonial Algerian cities. One remarkable passage is worth citing in full:
Observers have compared the action of the Algerian woman to 
that of certain women resistance fighters or even secret agents 
of the specialized services. It must be constantly borne in mind 
that the committed Algerian woman learns both her role as 
“a woman alone in the street” and her revolutionary mission 
instinctively. The Algerian woman is not a secret agent. It is 
without apprenticeship, without briefing, without fuss, that she 
goes out into the street with three grenades in her handbag or 
the activity report of an area in her bodice. She does not have the 
sensation of playing a role she has read about so many times in 
novels, or seen in motion pictures. There is not that coefficient of 
play, of imitation, almost always present in this form of action 
when we are dealing with a Western woman.
 What we have here is not the bringing to light of a 
character known and frequented a thousand times in imagina-
tion or in stories. It is an authentic birth in a pure state, without 
preliminary instruction. There is no character to imitate. On 
the contrary, there is an intense dramatization, a continu-
ity between the woman and the revolutionary. (50; emphasis 
added)
Scholars have rightly critiqued Fanon’s gender politics,23 and Diana Fuss 
understandably reads this passage as “Fanon’s retrieval of an essential-
ist discourse of black femininity” in its insistence on instinctual action, 
“authentic birth,” and the emergence of a type of mimicry without a model 
(151). While the reading I present here departs from Fuss’s interpretation, it 
is inspired by her insight that “identification with the Other [identification 
of the unveiled Algerian woman with the white European woman] is nei-
ther a necessary precondition nor an inevitable outcome of imitation. For 
Fanon, it is politically imperative to insist upon an instrumental difference 
between imitation and identification, because it is precisely politics that 
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emerges in the dislocated space between them” (153). To read this form of 
mimesis as a successful instance of identification would mean to render 
the unveiled Algerian woman the “saved woman” of Western liberalist and 
colonialist rhetoric—the holy grail of liberal imperialist ideology.
It would seem here that Fanon is rejecting “imitation” and 
“play” as components of revolutionary mimetic practice, precisely the 
elements that Benjamin has isolated as the “two aspects” of mimesis. 
However, such a conclusion is only possible if we read these terms with 
a dogged literalism, assuming that both Benjamin and Fanon refer to 
the same thing when they speak of “semblance,” “imitation,” and “play.” 
Since the term play does not carry the same theoretical weight in Fanon’s 
schema as in Benjamin’s, we can assume for the time being that it refers 
to that which is opposed to the deadly seriousness of fln revolutionaries. 
“Imitation,” however, is central to Fanon’s schema. What the Algerian 
female revolutionary imitates is not an original found in the mimetic 
forms of novels or motion pictures; rather, her imitation—of a representa-
tion whose original copy is not locatable—itself constitutes an “intense 
dramatization.” As juxtaposed to novels and motion pictures, the intense 
dramatization is itself a kind of play, a variant of “theatrical improv”—
“theatrical” because it is a test performance and “improv” because its 
ends are radically open and uncertain, more radically, even, than the 
most open-ended closures of films and novels. Fanon does not repudiate 
play altogether, but by means of his concept of imitation, he highlights a 
particular variety of play.24 Like Benjamin, for whom the body of the mime 
(the ur-figure of mimetic acts) is the primary instrument for the interplay 
between semblance and play, Fanon insists on the centrality of the body 
in this scene of intense dramatization. As we will see, he goes further 
than Benjamin in theorizing the place of the body in the emergence of 
historically specific forms of mimesis.
For Fanon, “imitation” and “play” are together opposed to 
instinct; what he means by “imitation” can only be made clear if one ana-
lyzes what he means by “instinct.” As Fuss writes, political imperative is 
one key reason for Fanon’s insistence that the Algerian woman “learns 
both her role as ‘a woman alone in the street’ and her revolutionary mis-
sion instinctively.” The other reason is that he is cautious about using the 
term instinct to describe historical difference, that is, the emergence of 
a uniquely new and local mode of being in the world. In his earlier work, 
Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon, in what we may read as a radically anti-
essentialist position, critiques Carl Jung for confusing instinct and habit:
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Instinct, which is inborn (we know how we must view this 
“innateness”), invariable, specific; habit, which is acquired. 
On this level one would have only to demonstrate that Jung has 
confused instinct and habit. In his view, in fact, the collective 
unconscious is bound up with the cerebral structure, the myths 
and archetypes are permanent engrams of the race. I hope I have 
shown that nothing of the sort is the case and that in fact the 
collective unconscious is cultural, which means acquired. (188)
The notion of instinct as inborn is already suspect to Fanon; the fiction of 
inborn impulses has served colonialist politics well. In the accounts he 
provides of the damaged lives of René Maran and Mayotte Capécia, Fanon 
shows that while their experiences are inflected by gender, they have both 
cathected to the archetypes of colonialist typologies in which blackness 
figures as satanic and whiteness secures the good. Such cathexes are the 
result of psychic, cultural, and historical conditioning and trauma, not the 
expressions of inherent instincts. Moreover, such racial wounds do not in 
themselves guarantee revolutionary consciousness, as the examples of 
Maran and Capécia make clear. So why, in the case of the revolutionary 
woman who smuggles weapons and commits terrorist acts, does Fanon 
resurrect the term instinct to characterize her actions?
The answer lies in Fanon’s understanding of the Hegelian 
dialectic as he articulates it with his own phenomenology of difference 
(most succinctly put forth in the essay “The Fact of Blackness” in Black 
Skin, White Masks). His critique of Jean-Paul Sartre allows Fanon to 
foreground the tension, in part informed by his own clinical experience 
as a psychoanalyst, between conceptual determination and phenomeno-
logical overcoming. The phrase phenomenological overcoming does not 
appear in Fanon but is best suited to describe both the body that is in his 
account overcome, threatened, and inundated with racial typologies and 
the new body that sublates the meanings and traumas inflicted upon it. 
The “moment” (to use Hegelian language) between these two bodies is one 
of a radical transformation and the proper place of what Fanon would call 
“instinct” in A Dying Colonialism. In the earlier work, Black Skin, White 
Masks, Fanon sketches the dialectical significance of such a moment in 
his critique of Sartre’s Black Orpheus. According to Fanon, Sartre reads 
negritude as a moment in the unfolding of a historical dialectic: negritude 
is the “minor term” of negativity that itself will be sublated in the formation 
of a new reality. Fanon responds to this reading:
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When I read that page, I felt that I had been robbed of my last 
chance. I said to my friends, “The generation of the younger 
black poets has just suffered a blow that can never be forgiven.” 
Help had been sought from a friend of the colored peoples, and 
that friend had found no better response than to point out the 
relativity of what they were doing. For once, that born Hegelian 
had forgotten that consciousness has to lose itself in the night 
of absolute, the only condition to attain to consciousness of self. 
In opposition to rationalism, he summoned up the negative 
side, but he forgot that this negativity draws its worth from an 
almost substantive absoluteness. A consciousness committed to 
experience is ignorant, has to be ignorant, of the essences and 
the determinations of its being. (133–34)
Fanon’s criticism here of the negation of the negation, which would posi-
tion negritude as a moment of historical emergence in the service of 
a telos, is not a criticism of the dialectic itself, but of Sartre’s limiting 
deployment of it.25 In spite of his own ambivalences about negritude, it 
is of paramount political and philosophical importance for Fanon that 
black consciousness “lose itself in the night of the absolute,” and this is 
what negritude signifies. To experience the night of the absolute means 
to forget one’s own determination, as in a Nietzschean moment in which 
forgetting is central to the forging of truth. Nietzsche describes the rela-
tionships between forgetting, truth, and the historically significant action 
thus: “The historical sense makes its servants passive and retrospective; 
and almost the only time the sufferer from the fever of history becomes 
active is when this sense is in abeyance through momentary forgetful-
ness” (102). For Fanon, the truth that emerges from black consciousness 
is possible only via a phenomenological reassembly of the self, a process 
that is only possible with revolutionary action itself. Such action can take 
aesthetic forms (such as those created by the writers and philosophers of 
negritude), as well as “properly” political forms (the fln, for example), but 
the precondition of such revolutionary impulses is a foundational forget-
ting. For Fanon, the emergence of the black revolutionary consciousness 
does not happen ex nihilo, since the trauma that is colonialism provides 
its basic components. Bodily perception necessarily remains central to 
this self’s constitution since it was the access point for the black subject’s 
original trauma, reduced as he or she is to sheer skin, to sheer surface.26 
Importantly for Fanon, there is no guarantee that the trauma of colonialism 
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will lead to the conditions of a revolutionary consciousness, and even 
after decolonization, the subversive energies of revolutionary acts can be 
easily appropriated by the nationalist bourgeoisie.27 But the “night of the 
absolute,” in which conceptual determination is forgotten for the sake of 
an instinctual mimetic practice (aesthetic and political), is the crucible 
for a new humanity.
By pointing out the tension between the dominative aspect of 
conceptual thinking (whose essence can be paraphrased as “to determine 
something is to kill it”) and the phenomenological bodily experience of 
subjects under colonialism, Fanon is not carving out a prediscursive space 
of revolutionary energies, since the “night of the absolute” happens in 
history, and its precipitate—revolutionary consciousness—is formed out of 
given historical and cultural schemas. Fanon’s argument here correlates 
with Benjamin’s and Adorno’s reflections on mimesis, which locate it as a 
potentially revolutionary faculty associated with magical rites, ritual, and 
bodily experiences.28 For Adorno, mimesis names a nondominating form 
of apprehending the world, and like the repressed, it returns in modernity 
in destructive forms. Nevertheless, Adorno explains, “[M]imetic behavior 
does not imitate something but assimilates itself to that something” (162).29 
So even if the women of the fln appear to imitate European women, they 
are demonstrating their assimilation not to European comportments but to 
the forms of being found in the “night of the absolute.” Similarity is not the 
same as equivalence, and assimilation is not always capitulation. Like all 
historical dialectics, this drama of mimesis has its necessary destructive 
side, but the nature of its destruction is not synonymous with domination; 
rather, it is a violent rejection of the present order of things. The violence 
entailed in the self’s phenomenological overcoming need not necessarily 
lead to new forms of domination and control. And yet the revolutionary act 
remains a fragile opening, potentially subject to appropriation by newly 
dominating structures of the postcolonial state. So revolutionary action is 
a kind of mimetic experimentation, “playful” in Benjamin’s sense,30 and 
it is bound to succeed or fail with no guarantees. Fanon’s use of the word 
instinct turns out to refer not to a historically unvarying, deep-rooted 
essence, but to a historically situated phenomenological experience.
Reading Historical Difference
I began this essay by considering the problem of self-conscious 
reading practices that attend to the gap between their own concepts and 
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the objects at hand. The redefinition of historical difference I would like 
to suggest is, in the spirit of the thinkers examined here, a reorientation 
of reading practices. Each of the thinkers is concerned, in different ways, 
with the coercive relationship of the universal to the particular.
This relationship between the particular and the universal, 
as a political-philosophical problem, cuts across postcolonial thought in 
a diverse array of problematics: the production of the subject of rights, 
the hegemony of the nation-state form, the subaltern subject, the writing 
back to empire, and so on. In Marx’s account of labor, this relationship is 
a hierarchical one: abstraction is the horizon upon which particularity 
disappears. Real labor becomes meaningful as such only when the work of 
abstraction has converted it to abstract labor. Particularity, in other words, 
only becomes legible at the moment of its disappearance into the general, 
or universal. For Chakrabarty, the hope for postcolonial historiography 
rests in arresting this irreducible particularity as the brute, inassimilable 
character of his subject/object (the subaltern, for example) that creates a 
“breach in history’s systems of representations.” In Marx’s Hegelian under-
standing, the particular seems destined for incorporation into the general: 
Real Labor becomes Abstract Labor; the particular class (the proletariat) 
becomes a placeholder for the universal interests of humanity. The object 
is fully congruent with its concept, and when it is not, then history is a 
dialectical process of it becoming so.
Adorno and Benjamin sought a way out of such idealist assump-
tions, the source of philosophy’s confrontation with false antinomies—
among others, the tyranny of the concept, on the one hand, and the 
opacity of the Kantian thing-in-itself, on the other. Their solution—the 
constellation—represented a methodology as well as a thought figure. In 
the Trauerspiel study, Benjamin writes that “ideas are to phenomena as 
constellations are to stars” implying a radical relationship of dependence 
between the universal and the particular (Origin 34; trans. mod.). His 
concept of a constellation preserves the sense of a whole without tethering 
that wholeness to a determining and absolute principle, as in Hegel. This 
aspect of Benjamin’s thought, developed in collaboration with Adorno, is 
central to the contribution these thinkers have to make to postcolonial 
problematics. The relationship between the particular and the general, 
the concrete and the abstract, is foundational to Chakrabarty’s contentions 
in particular and postcolonial thought in general.
As a representation of truth, which for Benjamin and Adorno 
is historically transient and materially mediated, the constellation seeks 
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to present the relationship between the particular and the general as 
a relationship. A rigorously materialist methodology, the constellation 
foregrounds the referential world that was the source of philosophy’s 
inspiration in the first place. The material phenomenon, as the object, 
is broken into its elements and, as Susan Buck-Morss explains, “[These] 
particulars, although conceptually mediated, reemerge in the idea; or 
more accurately, they become the ideas in the conceptual arrangement 
of their elements. The role of the subject, to draw connections between 
phenomenal elements, was not unlike that of the astrologer, who perceived 
figures in the heavens” (Origin 92).31 The mimetic faculty underpins both 
the recognition of constellations and the recognition of their truth. Mime-
sis, in the form of the constellation, allows for a noncoercive coexistence 
of nonidentical particulars. The elements in constellations do not stand 
in relations of hierarchy among themselves, but foreground the interplay 
between totality and the particular as a productive tension through which 
truth—in all of its historical transience—is born. The totality does not sub-
sume any of its elements, and since in it truth results from the conceptual 
arrangement of the elements in all of their particularity, the relationship 
of the particular to the general is nonidentical. The constellation stages 
nonidentity as method.
In an epigraph to Convolute N, “On the Theory of Knowledge, 
Theory of Progress,” widely acknowledged as Benjamin’s statement on 
method, he cites Marx: “Our election cry must be: Reform of Consciousness 
not through dogmas, but through the analysis of mystical consciousness 
that is unclear to itself, whether it appears in a religious or a political form. 
Then people will see that the world has long possessed the dream of a 
thing—and that it only needs to possess the consciousness of this thing in 
order to really possess it” (Arcades N5a, 1). The “not-yet” posited by Benja-
min’s elaboration of this Marxist problematic, the disjuncture between the 
“dream of a thing” and the “consciousness of this thing” is not of the order 
of the structural contradictions in the base that would lead to the abolition 
of capital. Neither is it the “not-yet” that refers, as Chakrabarty puts it in 
his revisionist deconstructivist reading of structural contradictions, to “a 
process of deferral internal to the very being (that is, logic) of capital. [. . .] 
Difference lives in intimate and plural relationships to capital, ranging 
from opposition to neutrality” (66). Rather, this “not-yet” is akin to the 
nunc stans of Bloch, in which the present is figured as impeded yet simul-
taneously pregnant with possibility. The schism between the particular 
historical reality and the utopic promise of the commodity is simply the 
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space between two elements in a constellation; if the commodity promises 
fulfillment, it simultaneously creates desire for a different order of things, 
a desire generated by the treadmill of history’s past and present failures.32 
For Fanon, such desire is the basis for the first revolutionary action.
Historical difference, then, may be redefined as the following: 
the precise organization of form and perception under specific historical 
conditions, the particular mimetic strategies of a historical collective, 
and also the phenomenological comportment toward futurity that is at 
the same time a historically specific apprehension of the past. In other 
words, History 2s have their own temporal and representational dialectics. 
Rethinking History 2 on this interpretive terrain means bringing it back 
into a dialectical movement rather than attaching it as a constitutive core 
of capital, a move, in my mind, that only allows us to observe and describe 
more closely the status quo, giving succor to an additive analysis that can 
lapse into a defanged form of empiricism.33 The representation and rec-
ognition of historical difference itself cannot provide a guarantee that the 
(Derridean) supplement we have located will fulfill our expectations of 
disruption or that the phenomenon will become a trace or a supplement 
in this sense simply because we name it so.34
If we read History 2 not as the process within capital that end-
lessly defers the Becoming of the commodity, but rather as the result of the 
dialectic that takes place in the mimetic realm, the dialectic that brings 
the past into legibility through mimetic forms, then how do we conceive 
of historical difference? In the former schema, historical (this includes 
cultural, racial, and sexual) difference acquires the status of a Derridean 
supplement. In the latter, perhaps we can reorient the deconstructive 
function of the supplement toward the realm of the material. The power of 
History 2, then, lies not in the mere reflection of the practices of alternate 
temporalities, of the enchanted life-world, but in the historically specific 
forms of questioning (mimetic reading) about why the world got made 
(mimesis-as-worlding) in the way it did (mimetic forms).
In such a reformulation, History 2 does not slip into a roman-
ticism that defines it as consistently disruptive of History 1; one risks 
fetishizing difference if the historian has decided in advance to reveal it as 
the particular-that-disrupts. This becomes all the more problematic when 
such difference is intended to guarantee the political progressiveness of 
our intellectual projects or the moral rectitude of our objects and subjects 
in difference.35 Along with considering subaltern difference, we must also 
consider the difference of contemporary postcolonial and “First World” 
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politicians and supporters of the nation-state, who also “believe in” super-
natural beings. Insofar as theological language becomes central to their 
conservative platforms, we cannot ignore the conservative (or potentially 
progressive) role of, for example, gods in the nation-state. By rethinking 
historical difference dialectically, we can not only accommodate indig-
enous difference but also arm a critical project against indigenous versions 
of domination. Enumerating differences, gaps, caesurae, and so on, cannot 
in itself be the object(ive) of history writing if capital produces and relies 
upon difference because of its logic of equivalence. This means not that 
difference is tethered to the universal, but that it cannot exist except in a 
negative dialectical relation to it.
Insofar as History 2 illuminates historical difference—alterna-
tive ways of being in the world that have been written over by the narratives 
of modernity, citizenship, and the nation-state—Chakrabarty’s insistence 
that we turn to the “dreamed-up pasts and futures whose collectivities 
are defined neither by the rituals of citizenship nor by the ‘nightmare’ of 
tradition that ‘modernity’ creates” needs to be taken seriously. The cen-
tral question that Fanon had isolated as the constant preoccupation of the 
colonized remains relevant for postcoloniality: “Who am I, in reality?” 
(Wretched 182). Adorno’s and Benjamin’s oeuvre lays out a fragmented 
theory of perception and mimesis in which perception is not merely a way 
of seeing but simultaneously a way of becoming. For colonial/postcolonial 
subjects, the answer to Fanon’s question can be sought partially in the 
mimetic forms of their modern life-world and in its genealogies.
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Ellen Rooney for their helpful feedback and suggestions.
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1 The subaltern is not, therefore, a 
member of a class as such (think 
Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire); 
as a class, it is constative rather 
than performative. In a recent 
essay, Spivak calls subalternity 
“a position without identity,” 
which is to say, “[S]ubalternity 
is where social lines of mobility, 
being elsewhere, do not permit 
the formation of a recognisable 
basis of action” (“Scattered” 476). 
Spivak’s use of the word “identity” 
is very different from Adorno’s 
use. Spivak refers to the produc-
tion of political subjects who 
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may metonymically represent 
themselves in the political order; 
Adorno refers to the process of 
capture whereby the concept 
exhausts its referent.
2 On the universal subject of rights, 
see (among others) Benhabib; and 
Butler, Laclau, and Žižek.
3 Strictly speaking, Chakrabarty’s 
project in Provincializing Europe 
is not a project about subalternity. 
The subaltern figure is a point 
of departure for analyzing forms 
of affiliation and ways of being 
in the world that exceed modern 
grids of legibility (the national 
subject, nation-state form, etc.). 
For a critique of Chakrabarty’s 
use of the term “subaltern,” and 
of Provincializing Europe as a 
whole, see Kaiwar, “Silences” and 
“Towards.”
4 Aamir Mufti discusses a similar 
impulse, what he calls the “aura 
of authenticity,” in postcolonial 
criticism. See Mufti. Rey Chow 
elaborates on a tendency in cer-
tain postcolonial work, “which 
may be paraphrased as follows: 
deconstruct the danger and 
pitfalls of a certain term in its 
conventional usage; rescue that 
term for its inherent ‘heterogene-
ity’ and ‘difference’; affirm this 
‘heterogeneity’ and ‘difference’ 
when it is used by certain groups 
of people” (Primitive 191).
5 Responding to Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri’s argument that 
the local is often a production of 
the global, Chakrabarty writes in 
a new introduction to the latest 
edition of Provincializing Europe: 
“Difference is not always a trick 
of capital. My sense of loss that 
ensues from my globalization 
does not always make a consumer 
of me. Often the loss in question 
relates to cultural practices that, 
so to speak, will no longer ‘sell.’ 
Not every aspect of our sense of 
the local can be commodified (I 
wish it could)” (xviii). Chakrab-
arty is, of course, correct in that 
all affect is not grist for capital’s 
mill. But making a consumer 
of someone is not the only trick 
of capital. Nevertheless, taking 
Chakrabarty on his own terms, 
the qualification missing from 
this statement is, of course, that 
affects can and do become com-
modified now and again, even if 
their use by capital is not simply 
restricted to commodification. 
For a critique of Chakrabarty’s 
treatment of identity, see Ismail.
6 Saba Mahmood has written about 
the ways in which such binarisms 
in Western feminism reproduce 
the logics of liberalism itself.
7 In Chakrabarty’s account, dialec-
tical hermeneutics only appears 
as an example of the homogeniz-
ing impulse of all Eurocentric 
reading practices. To cite one 
example: “These voices [of dif-
ference] [. . .] remind us of the 
deep ambivalences that marked 
the trajectory of the modern pri-
vate and bourgeois individuality 
in colonial India. Yet historians 
manage, by maneuvers of the 
old ‘dialectical’ card trick called 
‘negation of negation,’ to deny a 
subject position to this voice of 
ambivalence” (38).
8 As Marx writes, “[B]y equating 
their different products to each 
other in exchange as values, they 
equate their different kinds of 
labour as human labour. They do 
this without being aware of it” 
(Capital 167).
9 “[C]apital [. . .]—quite unin-
tentionally—reduces human 
labor, expenditure of energy, to 
a minimum. This will redound 
to the benefit of emancipated 
labour, and is the condition of its 
emancipation” (Marx, Grundrisse 
701).
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10 The full quotation reads:
The only intrinsic result of 
the contradiction, which is com-
pletely immanent to the economic 
structure, does not tend towards 
the supersession of the contradic-
tion, but to the perpetuation of its 
conditions. The only result is the 
cycle of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. [. . .] The “limit” towards 
which the movement of the mode 
of production tends [. . . is] not 
therefore a question of a ladder, 
of a threshold to be attained. If 
the tendency cannot pass these 
limits, it is because they are inside 
it, and as such never reached: in 
its movement it carries them with 
it, they coincide with the causes 
which make it a “mere” tendency, 
i.e., they are simultaneous with its 
actual conditions of possibility. 
(Althusser and Balibar 291)
11 Chakrabarty makes it explicit that 
by differentiating History 1 and 
2 he is not referring to “uneven 
development,” a concept that has 
a long and varied history in Marx-
ist theory. In his own words, this 
concept presumes “at least an 
underlying structural unity (if not 
an expressive totality) to histori-
cal process and time that makes 
it possible to identify certain 
elements in the present as ‘anach-
ronistic’ ” (12). Such a concept, in 
Chakrabarty’s view, is of a piece 
with the kind of historicism from 
which he wishes to distance 
himself. See also his “Epilogue: 
Reason and the Critique of 
Historicism” in Provincializing 
Europe (237–56).
12 Incidentally, in Chakrabarty’s 
account it is unclear whether 
History 2 names a structural or 
a historical process. In Marx, 
such ambiguity is the source of 
capital’s logic of reproduction. Yet 
Chakrabarty prefaces his decon-
structive reading of History 2 as 
a “process of deferral internal to 
the very being (that is, logic) of 
capital” by stating: “Marx himself 
warns us against understandings 
of capital that emphasize the his-
torical at the expense of the struc-
tural or the philosophical” (65). 
But as we have seen, history and 
structure are not mutually exclu-
sive in Marx’s account. By empha-
sizing the “structural” aspects of 
History 2 but nevertheless naming 
it “History,” Chakrabarty’s con-
ception remains densely textured 
and more complex than his own 
account of it would allow.
13 For a sustained discussion of 
how Benjamin’s conception of 
innervation is grounded in the 
mimetic faculty, and the differ-
ences between the psychoanalytic 
and Benjaminian meanings of the 
term, see Hansen, “Benjamin and 
Cinema.”
14 In a fragment from 1936—the 
same year in which he wrote the 
artwork essay—Benjamin writes, 
“Perhaps Stone Age man pro-
duced such incomparable draw-
ings of the elk only because the 
hand guiding the implement still 
remembered the bow with which 
it had felled the beast” (Selected 
3: 258). All forms of mimesis 
assume a bodily foundation for 
the mimetic capacity, and the 
ancient form of mimesis is asso-
ciated here with what Benjamin 
calls Erfahrung, or “long experi-
ence” in the 1940 essay, “On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire.”
15 At the same time, as Michael 
Taussig’s work demonstrates, 
mimesis is inseparable from 
alterity. To mime the other means 
to project oneself outward to the 
other and be in the other’s place. 
See Taussig, Mimesis and Ner-
vous. For a critique of Taussig’s 
account, see Jay, “Unsympa-
thetic.” For the ensuing exchange 
between Martin Jay, Michael 
Taussig, and Paul Stoller, see Jay, 
“Martin”; Stoller; and Taussig, 
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“Michael.” See Huggan for a cri-
tique of Taussig’s conflation of 
mimicry with mimesis.
16 Chakrabarty includes Bloch in 
his condemnation of historicism 
(12) and notions of uneven devel-
opment but misses the import of 
Bloch’s dialectical reading of the 
nonsynchronous that reads the 
contemporaneous as coeval with 
the present, a trace of the past, yet 
also a possibility for the future. 
Bloch’s reading, in fact, breaks 
with rather than supports the sort 
of historicism that Chakrabarty 
himself critiques.
17 Repetition, the sectioning of time, 
the search for heightened sensa-
tion, and the fragmented nature 
of experience can lead, in the 
modern age, to a fatal spiral of 
aesthetics and anaesthetics. See 
Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics.”
18 Such contextualization, inciden-
tally, is another important mean-
ing of historicism in the German 
intellectual tradition in general, 
and in Benjamin and Dilthey 
in particular. See Dilthey. I am 
grateful to Susan Buck-Morss for 
pointing this out.
19 Chakrabarty also takes histori-
cism to task. To the modern tra-
dition of historicism—especially 
as it found articulation in the 
“colonial theatre,” where “the 
theme of ‘freedom,’ as defined by 
modern political philosophy, was 
constantly invoked in aid of the 
ideas of ‘civilization,’ ‘progress,’ 
and latterly, ‘development’ ”—he 
suggests the following response: 
“The task, as I see it, will be to 
wrestle with ideas that legitimize 
the modern state and its attendant 
institutions, in order to return to 
political philosophy—in the same 
way as suspect coins are returned 
to their owners in an Indian 
bazaar—its categories whose 
global currency can no longer be 
taken for granted” (45). The his-
torian must critique historicism 
but also find strategies for con-
ceptualizing historical difference 
without abandoning a “commit-
ment to theory” (46). At bottom, it 
is the universalism of the hege-
monic narratives of citizenship 
and the modern state with which 
Chakrabarty finds fault.
20 Benjamin’s messianism is a 
source of disappointment for 
some commentators. However, 
Hansen makes an intriguing 
argument that it is precisely Ben-
jamin’s messianism that prevents 
him from assuming a previously 
unalienated state of being. See 
Hansen, “Room-for-Play.” Jewish 
mysticism here is akin to a meth-
odology, much like psychoanaly-
sis. For a reading of Benjamin’s 
messianism as methodology, see 
Buck-Morss, Dialectics 229–52.
21 “In the colonies the economic 
substructure is also the super-
structure. The cause is the conse-
quence; you are rich because you 
are white, you are white because 
you are rich. This is why Marxist 
analysis should always be slightly 
stretched every time we have to 
do with the colonial problem” 
(Fanon, Wretched 40).
22 Some illuminating discussions 
of Fanon’s universalism include 
Malik; Mazrui; and Melas.
23 See “Interior Colonies” in Fuss 
(141–65); Bergner; Chow, “Poli-
tics”; Doane; Goldie; Khanna; and 
Sharpley-Whiting.
24 I am indebted to Diana Fuss for 
this insight.
25 For a fuller account of Fanon’s 
deployment of dialectical 
thinking, see Sekyi-Otu.
26 In an astute analysis of Fanon’s 
phenomenology, read through 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gayle 
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Salamon makes the case that for 
Fanon, the phenomenological 
difference that race makes is to 
deprive the subject of a place of 
retreat within itself.
27 See “Pitfalls of National Con-
sciousness” in Fanon, Wretched 
(148–205).
28 Of course, in The Wretched of the 
Earth, Fanon describes the begin-
nings of nationalist conscious-
ness as a retrieval and invention 
of local tradition: in the form of 
rites, rituals, dances, poetry.
29 Adorno uses the word sich 
anschmiegen (nestle oneself 
against) rather than Nachahmung 
(imitation) in this discussion of 
mimesis. For the valences of these 
different terms in German, see 
Jay, “Mimesis and Mimetology.” 
For a discussion of the relevance 
of anschmiegen for historically 
different aesthetic practices, see 
my Afterimage of Empire (125–31). 
The present quotation about 
mimetic behavior assimilating 
itself to something is from Len-
hardt’s earlier (1984) translation, 
though neither the earlier nor 
the latest translation is consis-
tent with respect to the verb sich 
anschmiegen, locating it when 
it is not there in the original, 
or rendering it unrecognizable 
when it is there. Adorno’s original 
text corresponding to Lenhardt’s 
translation reads: “Ahmt das 
mimetische Verhaltn nicht etwas 
nach, sondern macht sich selbst 
gleich, so nehmen die Kunstwerke 
es auf sich, eben das zu vol-
lziehen” (Ästhetische 169). How-
ever, when Adorno actively uses 
the verb sich anschmiegen, he 
writes: “In den Kunstwerken ist 
der Geist zu ihrem Konstruktion-
sprinzip geworden, aber genügt 
seinem Telos nur dort, wo er aus 
dem zu Konstruierenden, den 
mimetischen Impulsen, aufsteigt, 
ihnen sich anschmiegt, anstatt 
daß er ihnen souverän zudiktiert 
würde” (Ästhetische 180). The 
newer, now standard translation 
by Hullot-Kentor (1997) renders 
this as, “In artworks spirit has 
become their principle of con-
struction, although it fulfills its 
telos only when it emerges from 
what is to be constructed, from 
the mimetic impulses, by shap-
ing itself to them rather than 
allowing itself to be imposed on 
them by sovereign rule” (118). 
Adorno develops this alternate 
notion of mimesis particularly 
in the section titled “Semblance 
and Expression” (Hullot Ken-
tor, trans., 100–117) in Aesthetic 
Theory, but also in Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (with Hork-
heimer). The secondary literature 
on Adorno’s (and Horkheimer’s) 
conception of mimesis is vast, 
but with respect to Adorno’s use 
of the word anschmiegen and its 
related neologism, anbilden (“to 
image onto”), Michael Cahn’s and 
Martin Jay’s discussions of these 
terms are indispensable.
30 “Play” in this account does not 
refer to the poststructuralist 
category of “free play,” with its 
emphasis on the textual dimen-
sions of play in the field of mean-
ing. Instead, it refers to a mate-
rialist and dialectical aspect of 
mimesis in which engagement 
with objective realities trans-
forms those realities through per-
formance, gambling (risk-taking), 
and games. These three strands 
of play encompass some of the 
multiple meanings of the German 
word Spiel. For more on Benja-
min’s notion of play, see Hansen, 
“Room-for-Play.” An alternate 
and non-poststructuralist geneal-
ogy of play can be constructed 
through the works of Friedrich 
Schiller, Johan Huizinga, Roger 
Caillois, Karl Krauss, Adolf Loos, 
and of course, Theodor Adorno 
and Frantz Fanon.
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31 For a detailed account of the 
constellation in Benjamin’s and 
Adorno’s work, see Buck-Morss, 
Origin 82–110.
32 For an elaboration of this aspect 
of Benjamin’s work, see Buck-
Morss, Origin 110–58.
33 Empiricism is most insightful 
when its objects transform theo-
retical apparatuses rather than 
becoming a means for filling out, 
in an additive manner, a pre-
figured theoretical design. As a 
thought figure, the constellation 
reenergizes empiricism by hold-
ing out a critical space in thought 
for the concrete particular that is 
not subsumed by the general, or 
simply marshaled in its service.
34 The performative gestures of 
interpretation meet their limit 
in the intractability of actually 
existing objects and facts, whose 
presence, though mediated, must 
energize and transform theory if 
the latter is to have any material 
grounding.
35 To take one example, in 1998 in 
India, Prime Minister Vajpayee 
encouraged people to place ashes 
from the nuclear testing done that 
year as offerings at temples. In 
this case History 2 is not progres-
sive or disruptive, but participates 
in the phantasmagoria of mod-
ernization and citizenship. For 
a more detailed account of this 
event, see Aravamudan.
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